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Abstract 
Prior research reported that accounting conservatism has increased over time in developed countries. In this paper, we try to examine the 
time-series extent and shift of accounting conservatism in emerging countries over the period 2000-2012. We also analyze differences in 
conservatism level across countries, regions, legal regimes and industries and the effect of size, Market-to-Book and leverage on the 
degree of conservatism. We use a set of measures to assess the degree of conservatism. These include changing time-series properties of 
profitability, earnings, cash flows, accruals components, asymmetric timeliness, Market-to-Book ratio. We find that the degree of 
conservatism is declined during the period between 2000 and 2007 and increased over the period 2007-2012.  In addition, we observe 
significant differences in accounting conservatism between countries, across regions and industries. 
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1. Introduction: 
Accounting conservatism is considered as one of the most important attribute of financial reporting and it has influenced 
accounting practice for at least five centuries (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a). Watts (2003a) argue that accounting practice is 
not only conservative, but it has become more and more conservative in the last 30 years. If the demand of conservatism 
has increased over time, the analysis of time-series financial statement needs to be adjusted in order to obtain more reliable 
interpretation of accounting numbers (Givoly and Hayn, 2000).  
Previous studies have tried to define, measure conservatism and explain the reasons behind its existence (Basu, 1997; 
Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Watts, 2003a; Watts, 2003b). According to them, conservatism can be of two types: conditional 
and unconditional. Conditional conservatism is defined as “the accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree of 
verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements” Basu (1997, p7). However, unconditional 
conservatism is defined as: “the on average understatement of the book value of net assets relative to their market value” 
Beaver and Ryan (2005, p269).  The first type of conservatism is mainly related to the understatement of profits; however 
the second type is more related to the understatement of assets. In detail, when conservatism (both types) is set off, many 
implications arise. In fact, the presence of conservatism results in lower cumulative net income and assets values (Mason, 
2004). In future periods, conservatism will induce an increase (decrease) in loss frequency (profitability) (Givoly and Hayn; 
2000, Khan and Watts, 2009) by deferring the recognition of positive economic events until their effective realization, while 
negative economic events are immediately recognized to anticipate any future bad news. Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) 
point out that when asymmetric recognition of bad news vs. good news is observed cumulatively over long periods, the 
market value of equity will be overstated relative to the book value of equity, thus conditional conservatism leads to an 
understatement of assets value  and overstatement of liabilities over time.  
In this sense, studying the level and the extent of accounting conservatism becomes an important task in accounting 
research. Lai et al. (2012) denoted that understanding the shift and the trend in conservatism may have implications on 
financial statement analysis. In the same vein, Givoly and Hayn (2000) stated that if the degree of conservatism increases 
over time, a time-series analysis of financial statement should take in account the conservative characteristic by making 
adjustment for the varying level of conservatism in order to obtain more reliable analysis of accounting numbers. They also 
argued that understanding the time-series change in earnings, cash flows and accruals component is important for investors, 
researchers, auditors and regulatory bodies. For example, Basu (1997) stated that auditors will support more legal liability 
if recognition of bad news is late. Therefore, be aware of changes in conservatism level will help auditors to face their legal 
liability (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a). Prior studies supported the idea that accounting conservatism has increased over time 
in the context of developed countries. Givoly and Hayn (2000) studied the time-series change in accounting conservatism 
  
by examining the changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals by using four different measures of 
accounting conservatism. They reported that companies from US exhibit an increased level of conservative financial 
reporting over time especially during the period between 1950 and 1998. However Grambovas et al. (2006) found that 
conservatism has increased in European countries from 1989 to 1998 and declined both in US and Europe over the period 
1998-2004. In other context, Lai et al. (2012) concluded that the degree of conservatism in Australia fluctuates without any 
obvious trend over the 17-year period from 1993 to 2009. Other studies have focused on international differences in 
accounting conservatism. For example, Gassen et al. (2013) reported that common law countries are likely to exhibit more 
conservative financial statements than code law countries. Their results coincide with earlier work initiated by Ball et al. 
(2000) who also found that the level of conservatism is higher in common law than in code law countries. 
The objective of this paper is two-fold. First, we try to examine the time-series variation of accounting conservatism in 
developing markets including 47 countries belong to emerging and frontier emerging markets over the period of 2000 to 
2012. Second we analyze the cross-sectional differences in the level of conservatism among different emerging regions, 
industries and legal regimes (common law and civil law). Our work is motivated by many reasons.  First, to the best of our 
knowledge, no previous studies have examined the temporal variation of conservatism in emerging markets.  Second, 
emerging market have recognized in last decade an economic and financial upheaval (crisis) which may rendered many 
businesses, accounts and auditors extremely prudent (conservative) in order to face any allegation, embezzlement or other 
misuses resources. Third, emerging markets have different institutional factors comparing to developed countries which 
means that the demand of conservatism according to taxation, litigation, regulation and contracting factors (Watts, 2003a) 
can be different from that  in US and EU countries. Thus, the results of studying the trend and the extent of conservatism 
may different in emerging markets comparing to developed countries.  
We offered several novel contributions to existing literature. Following the same approach adopted by Givoly and Hayn 
(2000) and Lai et all (2012), we use four measures of conservatism: (1) loss frequency and profitability (Return-on-Asset), 
(2) distribution of cash flows and accruals, (3) market-to-Book ratio, (4) The Basu (1997) measure of timeliness to assess 
the time varying of the degree of conservatism over time. We find that the level of conservatism according to the profitability 
measure (ROA) has decreased from 2000 to 2007 and has increased during the period between 2007 and 2012.  We find 
also the same result using the Market-to-Book ratio as a measure of unconditional conservatism. With regard to the 
distribution of accruals, we report a negative accumulation of non-operating accruals which is more pronounced in the 
period of 2007 to 2012. 
Our study contributes to existing literature by examining also the cross-regions differences in the level of conservatism. 
We find that firms belong to countries from East Europe exhibit more conservatism than those from Asia and MENA/Africa 
countries. However, American countries firms do not produce conservatism earnings compared with firms from the other 
regions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents definitions of conservatism and how it can be 
measured. Section 3 presents our research design including sample selection, emerging market characteristics and variables 
measures. Section 4 shows the findings related to conservatism’s time varying. Findings related to the cross-sectional 
differences in conservatism are discussed in section5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Conservatism measures 
Conservatism has been viewed as one of the most important attributes of financial reporting and has been used over 
other accounting principles such as historical cost and realization conventions for centuries (Basu, 1997; Chan et al. 2009). 
Basu’s (1997, p. 7) defined conservatism as: “the accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification for 
recognizing good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses”. Under this interpretation, earnings will reflect bad 
news more quickly than good news. Beaver and Ryan (2005, p269) defined accounting conservatism as “the on average 
understatement of the book value of net assets relative to their market value”. Under this interpretation, conservatism will 
lead to the understatement of net assets comparing to their market value. Givoly and Hayn (2000, p292) argued that 
“conservatism is a selection criterion between accounting principles that leads to the minimization of cumulative reported 
earnings by slower revenue recognition, faster expense recognition, lower asset valuation, and higher liability valuation”. 
The first consequence of conservatism is that the observed number of losses wil increase in time which means that the 
pourcentage of firms that report negative income will increase from year to year (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Balkrishna et al., 
2007; Khan and Watts, 2009). In the same sense, in period of conservatism the profitability as measured by ROA should 
increase over time. Another consequence of conservatism is that accruals tend to reverse (Givoly and Hyan, 2000). Indeed, 
   
during the period in which net income exceeds cash flows from operations, the accruals tend to be negative and when net 
income falls below cash flows, accruals take positive sign. Therefore another measure of conservatism is the sign of and 
the magnitude of cumulative accruals. Persistence of negative accruals is a sign of conservatism practices. In detail, accruals 
(TOACC) are decomposed into operating accruals (OPACC) and non-operating accruals (NOPACC). Basu (1997), Givoly 
and Hayn (2000) and Watts (2003b) argued that the first, the second and the third moment of the distribution of TOACC 
and NOPACC vary with conservatism. In addition to those measures, Givoly and Hayn (2000) used the skewness of earning 
distributions.  
The common used measure of conservatism was proposed by Basu (1997). Despite the criticism about this measure, it 
still widely used in accounting literature. Basu (1997) measured conditional conservatism using a reversal regression model 
which relates earnings to the return. The model is as follows: 
 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                (1) 
 
Where i indexes the firm, EAR is earnings, RET is the return of firrm i over the 12 months beginning nine months prior 
to the end of fiscal year t, DR is a dummy variable equal to 1 when RET > 0 and equal to 0 otherwise, and 𝜀𝑖 is the residual. 
According to Basu (1997), the magnitude of the coefficient on positive returns, 𝛽1, relates to the incremental response of  
accounting earnings to good news. Similarly, the degree of which bad news was impounded in earnings is measured by 
  𝛽2 + 𝛽3 and where 𝛽3 and the total bad news timeliness. According to Basu (1997), if conservatism exists,  𝛽3 should be 
significant and positive. Givoly and Hayn (2000) added another measure which is the relative sensitivity of earnings to bad 
news compared with their sensitivity to good news and which is measured by the ratio   (𝛽2 + 𝛽3)/  𝛽2 . In period of 
conservatism, this ratio should be greater than 1. However, the estimation value of the coefficient   𝛽2 sometimes is close 
or below to zero, which can affect the interpretation of this ratio. For this reason, Gassen et al. (2013) have modified this 
ratio using trigonometric concept. The modified ratio is given by: 
 
 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑈 = 𝐴𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔(𝛽2 + 𝛽3) − 𝐴𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔(𝛽2)                                                                                                           (2) 
We adopt this measure as an alternative to the ratio  (𝛽2 + 𝛽3)/  𝛽2. The greater (lower) value of BASU the greater 
(lower) the level of conservatismIn conclusion, following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Lai et al. (2012) we mainly use five 
measures: (1) The loss frequency; (2) the distribution of ROA, TACC, OPACC, and NOPACC; (3) the Market-to-Book 
ratio; (4) the asymmetric timeliness. 
For unconditional conservatism, the ratio market-to-book (MTB) can be used to measure the level of understatement of 
book values over their market value. A value of one of MTB is an indicator of presence of unconditional conservatism 
(Felthman and Ohlson, 1995; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007).  
3. Sample selection and variables measures: 
To analyze the time variation and cross-sectional differences in conservatism, we use data collected from companies 
belong to 47 emerging countries over the period from 2000 to 2012.  Countries are selected from both emerging markets 
and frontier emerging markets following MSCI and Standard and Poor’s classifications. The preliminary sample includes 
all firms from 47 emerging markets; however the unavailability of data for some variables had limited the number of 
countries to 37 countries. Countries are classified according to four regions: (i) Americas countries; (ii) Asia countries; (iii) 
MENA/Africa countries and (iv) East Europe countries.  The initial sample contains 46 223 firm-years observations. We 
exclude all firm-years with missing data for any variable used in the study. Besides, we eliminate financial firms from our 
analysis. In fact, some of used measures solely rely on accounting data (balance sheet, income statement) and financial 
firms report accounting numbers in different way from other firms. Therefore, our measures can be affected by these 
differences.   In addition, we exclude firms with negative total assets. Indeed, the value of total assets is used as a deflator 
in measuring conservatism indicators (ROA, CFOA, TACC, OPACC and NOPACC). The negative value can biased our 
result interpretations. Furthermore the percentage of firms with negative total assets is negligible comparing to the whole 
sample. Thus eliminating them does not affect results. We also delete firms in the top and bottom 1% of earnings, cash 
flows, and accruals component to eliminate extreme values. The final sample contains 35,846 firm-years observations. The 
data for all variables are collected from Thomson Financial and Worldscope databases. 
Consistent with Givoly and Hayn (2000), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Lai et al. (2012), the variable definitions and 
  
measurement are defined in Table 1.  
 
Table 1:  List of variables 
Variables Abbreviation 
Measures 
Earnings EAR  Earnings before extraordinary items 
Return on asset ROA  The ratio of net income-to-total assets 
Total  Accruals TACC  Difference between earnings and cash flows from operation deflated by total assets 
 
Operating Accruals 
 
OPACC 
 The change non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities (excluding 
short-term debt) deflated by total   assets 
 
Non-operating Accruals 
 
NOPACC 
  
 Difference between total accruals and operating accruals deflated by total assets 
Cash flow from operations CFOA 
 Income before extraordinary items + Depreciation and Amortization - change in 
working capital,  deflated by total assets 
Market-to-Book ratio MTB  Ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity 
Size Size  Natural logarithm of market capitalization 
Leverage Lev  Total debt to market capitalization 
Annual stock return RET 
 calculated by cumulating monthly returns ending 3 months after the firm’s fiscal year 
end 
4. Time variation of conservatism: 
The first objective of our study is to examine the time-series behavior conservatism’s measures over the period 2000 to 
2012. We provide descriptive statistics on the different measures discussed above. We also report results by subdividing 
our 13 years of data into two sub-periods (2000-2007 and 2008-2012). This allows us to test differences between these two 
periods. 
4.1. Loss frequency and profitability:  
The first measure that we use to examine the time variation in conservatism is the loss frequency calculated each year 
by counting the number of firms that reported negative income divided by the total number of firms in that year. However, 
the profitability across firms is measured using the ROA ratio. Table 2 shows the loss frequency for all years between 2000 
and 2012 and for the two sub-periods. Results show that the loss frequency has decreased from 21% in 2000 to 13% in 
2007. However the loss frequency has increased from 13% in 2007 to 17% in 2012 with peak in 2008 and 2009 to reach 
20%. The mean difference of loss frequency between the two sub-periods is positive and significant which means that the 
number of losses is greater in the period between 2007 and 2012 than in the period between 2000 and 2007. The profitability 
as measured by ROA ratio, exhibit the same pattern as for the loss frequency. In fact we observe an increase in the mean of 
ROA from 4.23 per cent in 2000 to 7.17 per cent in 2007 after that we observe a decline of ROA throughout the period 
from 7.17% in 2007 to 5% in 2012. The difference in the mean of ROA is significant between the two sub-periods (6.31% 
vs. 5.35%). The median of ROA is lower than the mean, indicating that the distribution of ROA is left skewed. In conclusion 
and based on those measure we can say the level of accounting conservatism has decreased in the period between 2000 to 
2007 and increased over the period 2007-2012. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Loss Frequency and profitability  
 
 
 
Year 
 
All Firms 
(N) 
 
Loss (N) 
Freq. of 
losses (%) 
 
ROA 
 
Sub-periods 
Freq. of 
losses (%) 
 
ROA 
Mean Median Mean Median 
2000 1038 218 21.00 .0432 .0410     
2001 1301 273 20.98 .0495 .0502     
2002 1472 307 20.86 .0485 .0498     
2003 1809 295 16.31 .0552    .0526      2000-2007 15.60 .06313 .0585 
2004 2075 307 14.80 .0641 .0612     
2005 2409 349 14.49 .0667 .0605     
2006 2779 390 14.03 .0679 .0617          
2007 3395 453 13.34 .0717 .0652 2008-2012 18.45 .05355 .0506 
2008 3299 681 20.64 .0563 .0546     
   
2009 3372 700 20.76 .0515 .0494 Difference 2.85 -0.007 -0.0079 
2010 3587 612 17.06 .0556 .0515 P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2011 4051 706 17.43 .0555 . 0532          
2012 5262 911 17.31 .0500 .0476     
4.2 Distribution of CFOA, TACC, OPACC and NOPACC 
4.2.1 Mean and Median: 
The mean and median of cash flows from operations, total accruals, operating accruals and non-operating accruals are 
displayed in table 4. The first indicator presented in the Table 3 is the cash flows from operation to total assets (CFOA) 
ratio which reflects the firms’ economic performance (Healy et al., 1992). According to the calculations, there is no obvious 
pattern over time. The result suggests that the increasing and the decreasing in the profitability observed in different periods 
are not related to the change in the distribution of cash flows from operation activities. The mean of TACC is negative in 
the 13-year period and most shifts in TACC come from NOPACC which also a negative mean over all years. The time-
series pattern of the median of TACC, NOPACC are similar to the behavior of mean. Also we remark that median of all 
variables are less than the mean, indicating that variables are left skewed. In detail, the mean of TACC was -3 percent of 
total assets in 2000 and become -1.43 per cent in 2007 however in 2008 this ratio takes the value of -6.17% and -3.79 per 
cent in 2012. The mean of TACC has declined between the two periods, indeed the mean difference between the two sub-
periods is negative and significant at 1% level. We observe the same result for the NOPACC. This result shows that the 
decreasing of profitability during the period between 2007 and 2012 can be attributed to the distribution of accruals over 
the same period that is the difference between earnings and cash flows.  
 
4.2.2 Variance of CFOA, TACC, OACC, NOACC: 
 
The time series change in the variances of ROA, TACC, OPACC and NOPACC is displayed in Table 4. The variance of 
ROA is constant over all years of the study. However, the TACC variance has increased from 1.43 per cent in 2000 to 7.13 
percent in 2012 and the NOAPCC variance has increased from 1.49 per cent in 2000 to 6.49 in per cent in 2012. Comparing 
the variance of TACC and NOPACC between the two sub-periods, we find that the variance was increased in the period of 
2007-2009 comparing to the period of 2000-2007. The increase in the TACC and NOPACC variances can suggest that the 
conservatism has increased after 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Mean and median of cash flows from operations and accruals deflated by total assets 
 
 
Year 
Mean Median 
N CFOA TACC OACC NOACC CFOA TACC OACC NOACC 
2000 1038 0.0706 -0.0300 0.0102 -0.0402 0.0751 -0.0402 0.0071 -0.0508 
2001 1301 0.0777 -0.0382 0.0091 -0.0473 0.0690 -0.0368 -0.0039 -0.0361 
2002 1472 0.0741 -0.0462 -0.0118 -0.0343 0.0611 -0.0298 0.0055 -0.0359 
2003 1809 0.0642 -0.0249 0.0149 -0.0398 0.0610 -0.0188 0.0133 -0.0380 
2004 2075 0.0643 -0.0165 0.0203 -0.0367 0.0716 -0.0231 0.0089 -0.0356 
2005 2409 0.0777 -0.0272 0.0065 -0.0337 0.0672 -0.0189 0.0140 -0.0391 
2006 2779 0.0687 -0.0181 0.0187 -0.0368 0.0652 -0.0138 0.0223 -0.0430 
2007 3395 0.0666 -0.0143 0.0274 -0.0416 0.0914 -0.0507 0.0079 -0.0607 
2008 3299 0.0983 -0.0617 0.0059 -0.0677 0.0650 -0.0298 -0.0108 -0.0172 
2009 3372 0.0687 -0.0352 -0.0192 -0.0160 0.0522 -0.0113 0.0203 -0.0365 
2010 3587 0.0505 -0.0101 0.0261 -0.0361 0.0685 -0.0266 0.0160 -0.0468 
2011 4051 0.0704 -0.0307 0.0183 -0.0490 0.0704 -0.0347 0.0070 -0.0446 
2012 5262 0.0725 -0.0379 0.0036 -0.0415 0.0751 -0.0402 0.0071 -0.0508 
2000-2007 16278 0.0691 -0.0242 0.0138 -0.0380 0.0660 -0.0217 0.0124 -0.0395 
2008-2012 19571 0.0717 -0.0348 0.0072 -0.0420 0.0686 -0.0299 0.0087 -0.0412 
Difference  0.0025 -0.0106 -.0066 -.00403 0.0026 -0.0082 -0.0036 -0.0053 
P-value  0.9291 0.000 0.000 0.0060 0.0037 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
  
Table 4: Variance of ROA, Cash flows and accruals 
 
Year Var(ROA) Var(CFOA) Var(TACC) Var(OPACC) Var(NOACC) 
2000 0.0044 0.0157 0.0143 0.0070 0.0149 
2001 0.0071 0.0156 0.0194 0.0081 0.0169 
2002 0.0063 0.0303 0.0351 0.0268 0.0112 
2003 0.0053 0.0102 0.0109 0.0058 0.0107 
2004 0.0073 0.0250 0.0208 0.0153 0.0254 
2005 0.0071 0.0141 0.0117 0.0156 0.0169 
2006 0.0073 0.0165 0.0139 0.0083 0.0125 
2007 0.0079 0.0148 0.0139 0.0094 0.0147 
2008 0.0089 0.0193 0.0181 0.0111 0.0165 
2009 0.0061 0.0194 0.0188 0.0137 0.0157 
2010 0.0057 0.0132 0.0119 0.0068 0.0106 
2011 0.0064 0.0267 0.0249 0.0190 0.0134 
2012 0.0046 0.0742 0.0713 0.0104 0.0694 
2000-2007 0.0069 0.0173 0.0166 0.0119 0.0155 
2008-2012 0.0062 0.0347 0.0330 0.0124 0.0291 
Difference -0.0007 0.0173 0.0164 0.1122 0.0136 
p-value 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.0028 0.000 
4.3 Market-to-Book Ratio (MTB): 
 
Our third measure is the market-to-book ratio. This index shows how much book value of equity is comparing to its 
market value. Recall that when conservatism is exercised, the MTB ratio should exceed the value of one. Figure 1 indicates 
the mean and the median of the MTB ratio. During the period between 2000 and 2007, the MTB mean has decreased from 
1.6 in 2000 to 0.89 in 2007, however during the period of 2007-2012, the MTB ratio has increased in mean to reach the 
value of 1.07 with a peak in 2008 of 1.48. Overall, the MTB mean is significantly greater in the period 20007-2012 than 
the mean in the period 2000-2007. Those results confirm the remarks about the trend of conservatism. Again, according to 
MTB values, unconditional conservatism has increased since 2007 after a period of decreasing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
                 Figure 1: Meand and Median of  MTB ratio 
 
4.4 Asymmetric timeliness: 
Table 6 shows the result of the annual regression estimation of the earning-return model presented above in equation 
(1). The estimations are made each year using all firms in all countries.  Consistent with previous results in US, Europe and 
Australia, the first measure which is the asymmetric timeliness coefficient, is positive in all years. These results show that, 
in general, the financial reporting systems are conservative, indicating that bad news is recognized faster than good news. 
During the period between 2000 and 2012 the coefficient of asymmetric timeliness varies from year to year without any 
obvious trend. It ranges between 0.0192 and 0.2259.  
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Table 6: annual estimations of Asymmetric timeliness: Basu (1997) Model 
 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
Year β0 β1 β2 β3 
Adj R²(%) N 
2000 
 
0.0646 
(0.000) 
0.0250 
(0.040) 
-0.0038 
(0.517) 
0.1015 
(0.000) 
 
5.04 
 
1038 
2001 
 
0.0419 
(0.000) 
-0.0373 
(0.011) 
0.0065 
(0.234) 
0.0636 
(0.103) 
 
2.56 
 
1301 
2002 
 
0.0734 
(0.000) 
-0.0158 
(0.158) 
-0.0001 
(0.972) 
0.1166 
(0.000) 
 
5.34 
 
1472 
2003 
 
0.0532 
(0.000) 
-0.0478 
(0.005) 
0.0037 
(0.188) 
0.0699 
(0.175) 
 
1.27 
 
1809 
2004 
 
0.0895 
(0.000) 
-0.0008 
(0.919) 
-0.0019 
(0.537) 
0.2259 
(0.000) 
 
11.35 
 
2075 
2005 
 
0.0851 
(0.000) 
-0.0404 
(0.000) 
-0.0009 
(0.413) 
0.1375 
(0.000) 
 
7.82 
 
2409 
2006 
 
0.0696 
(0.000) 
-0.0151 
(0.063) 
-0.0006 
(0.585) 
0.1277 
(0.000) 
 
3.07 
 
3299 
2007 
 
0.0752 
(0.000) 
-0.0091 
(0.143) 
0.0012 
(0.283) 
0.1339 
(0.000) 
 
5.42 
 
3372 
2008 
 
0.0364 
(0.000) 
0.0078 
(0.325) 
-0.00014 
(0.911) 
0.0192 
(0.003) 
 
0.20 
 
3299 
2009 
 
0.0437 
(0.000) 
-0.0799 
(0.000) 
-0.00025 
(0.703) 
0.0819 
(0.055) 
 
1.38 
 
3372 
2010 
 
0.0699 
(0.000) 
-0.0207 
(0.003) 
0.00756 
(0.008) 
0.1293 
(0.000) 
 
4.78 
 
3587 
2011 
 
0.0743 
(0.000) 
-0.0185 
(0.001) 
-0.0024 
(0.330) 
0.0994 
(0.000) 
 
4.87 
 
4051 
2012 
 
0.0555 
(0.000) 
-0.0154 
(0.001) 
-0.0028 
(0.263) 
0.1199 
(0.000) 
 
4.83 
 
5262 
5. Differences in conservatism level across regions, countries and industries 
In this section we try to analysis cross-sectional differences in conservatism. To do so, we use the Basu’s(1997) model. 
First, we compare the level of conservatism across regions and countries. Second we study the difference in conservatism 
level between industries.  
 
5.1 Differences in conservatism acrossrRegions and countries 
 
Table 7 reports time-series averages of the estimated annual coefficients and the average of the annual regressions’ 
adjusted R²s estimation of the Basu (1997) model given in equation (1). The estimations are computed for each country 
classified in four regions: AMERICA, ASIA, EAST EUROPE and MENA/AFRICA. Panel A of table 7 gives the 
estimations of the Basu (1997) model using firms which belong to America region. Only the following countries were 
retained in the analysis: Argentina, Brazil, Chili, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.  Following the results, the asymmetric 
timeliness coefficient, β3, is negative for all countries except for Argentina where the coefficient is positive but not 
significant. Overall, countries in South America region do not exhibit conservatism in their financial reporting. In addition, 
the estimation of the model for the global region also shows that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient is negative. 
 
Table 7: Panel A: Difference in accounting conservatism across country: AMERICAS region 
 
Countries β0 β1 β2 β3 BASU Adj R² 
Argentina 
 
0.048 
(0.043) 
0.042 
(0.418) 
0.185 
(0.318) 
0.157 
(0.628) 
8.401 
 
20.05 
 
Brazil 
 
0.142 
(0.039) 
-0.017 
(0.829) 
-0.083 
(0.312) 
-0.066 
(0.455) 
-3.760 
 
51.16 
 
Chili 
 
0.069 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.999) 
0.043 
(0.039) 
-0.293 
(0.411) 
-16.537 18.85 
  
Colombia 
 
0.095 0.004 0.034 0.267 14.824 44.73 
(0.000) (0.644) (0.678) (0.214)   
  
Mexico 
 
-0.240 0.317 0.637 -0.170 -7.479 26.22 
(0.436) (0.314) (0.297) (0.804)   
Peru 
 
0.069 -0.084 0.045 -0.344 -19.259 31.85 
(0.041) (0.420) (0.231) (0.447)   
AMERICAS 
 
0.074 -0.116 0.004 -0.319 -17.726 8.1 
(0.000) (0.237) (0.408) (0.477)   
 
Panel B of table 7 displays the result of estimations for countries from Asia region. They include China, India, Korea, 
Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippine, Thailand, and Taiwan. The results show that in all countries, the asymmetric 
timeliness coefficient is positive and significant except India, Pakistan (positive coefficient but not significant), Sri Lanka 
(negative coefficient). Overall, the financial reporting systems in Asia countries are conservative. Indeed the coefficient of 
asymmetric timeliness estimated for the entire Asia region is positive (0.1054) and significant (p-value=0.000). We also 
remark that Thailand firms report more conservative earnings (β3=0.2129; BASU= 11.993 degrees; average adjusted R² of 
9.06%) followed by Malaysia (β3=0.196; BASU=11.118 degrees; Average adjusted R² of 8.81%). However, China firms 
exhibit the less degree of conservatism (β3=0.0512; BASU=2.928 degrees; Average adjusted R² of 7.21%). The estimation 
results of the Basu’s (1997) model for countries in Europe region are given in Table 7 Panel C.  The model is estimated for 
firms belong to Greece, Hungry, Poland, Russia and Slovenia. According to the results, only firms in Greece report 
conservative financial statements. The coefficient β3 is positive (0.230) and significant (p-value=0.076) at 10% level. 
Despite this result, overall the coefficient β3 for the entire region is positive (0.270) and significant (p-value=0.051) at 10% 
level. 
We will turn our attention to the countries from MENA/Africa region. The results are exhibited in Table 8 Panel D. Only 
firms from South Africa (Africa region) have conservative reporting system. The coefficient β3 is positive (0.205; 
BASU=11.67 degrees)   and significant (p-value=0.001) at 1% level. For countries in MENA region, only Israel presents a 
positive and significant coefficient (β3 =0.133; BASU=7.57; Average Adj. R² =16.74%), however, for other countries 
(United Arab of Emirates; Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) the asymmetric timeliness coefficient β3 is positive but not 
significant, and negative in Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait. Nevertheless, overall countries, the coefficient β3 is positive (0.223) 
and significant (p-value=0.014) at 5% level indicating that firms in MENA/Africa have conservative reporting systems in 
general. 
Between the four regions, we find that firms from East Europe report more conservative earnings (β3=0.27; 
BASU=15.04 degrees, Average Adj R²= 13%) followed by MENA/Africa firms (β3=0.2236; BASU=12.63 degrees; 
Average Adj. R²= 9.12%) and Asia firms (β3=0.1054; BASU=6.02 degrees; Average Adj. R²=4.49%). 
 
 
Table 7, Panel B: Difference in accounting conservatism across country: ASIA region 
 
Countries β0 β1 β2 β3 BASU Adj R² 
China 
0.042 -0.003 0.018 0.051 2.928 7.21 
(0.001) (0.520) (0.045) (0.044)   
India 0.069 -0.012 0.002 0.017 1.013 1.47 
 (0.000) (0.191) (0.101) (0.456)   
Korea 0.077 -0.035 -0.009 0.160 9.141 8.26 
 (0.000) (0.075) (0.034) (0.000)   
Sri Lanka 0.108 -0.034 -0.008 -0.195 -11.045 ---- 
 (0.014) (0.525) (0.862) (0.602)   
Malysia 0.055 -0.014 -0.013 0.196 11.118 8.81 
(0.000) (0.383) (0.152) (0.000)   
Pakistan 0.106 0.021 0.084 0.075 4.265 9.26 
(0.000) (0.186) (0.322) (0.516)   
Philippine 0.072 -0.0001 0.017 0.096 5.523 12.31 
 (0.000) (0.996) (0.263) (0.072)   
Thailand 0.067 -0.002 0.010 0.212 11.993 9.06 
 (0.000) (0.911) (0.005) (0.005)   
Taiwan 0.053 -0.012 0.012 0.189 10.681 10.63 
 (0.000) (0.040) (0.393) (0.001)   
ASIA 0.061 -0.021 0.0003 0.105 6.016 4.49 
 (0.000) (-0.045) (-0.807) (0.000)   
 
Table 7, Panel C: Difference in accounting conservatism across country: EUROPE region 
 
   
Countries β0          β1          β2           β3         BASU        Adj R² 
Greece 
 
0.003 0.008 0.291 0.230 11.29 33.66 
(0.971) (0.861) (0.377) (0.076)     
Hungary 
 
0.024 -0.052 0.059 0.376 20.15 56.62 
(0.591) (0.465) (0.567) (0.439)     
Poland 
 
0.050 -0.054 0.047 -0.030 -1.73 31.74 
(0.002) (0.250) (0.076) (0.759)     
Russia 
 
0.106 0.057 -0.064 0.204 11.65 45.36 
(0.032) (0.117) (0.475) (0.201)     
Slovinia 
 
-0.076 0.127 0.460 -0.014 -0.67 60.33 
(0.426) (0.257) (0.199) (0.966)     
EAST EUROPE 
 
0.042 -0.017 0.016 0.270 15.04 13.00 
(0.012) (0.563) (0.444) (0.051)   
 
Table 7, Panel D: Difference in accounting conservatism across country: MENA/AFRICA 
 
Countries β0 β1 β2 β3 BASU Adj R² 
United Ar Emirates 0.092 -0.032 0.076 0.039 2.23 48.75 
 (0.021) (0.550) (0.355) (0.286)   
Egypt 0.113 -0.156 0.009 -0.710 -35.56 ***** 
 (0.000) (0.326) (0.590) (0.412)   
Israel 0.031 -0.006 -0.013 0.133 7.57 16.74 
 (0.097) (0.784) (0.663) (0.107)   
Jordan 0.071 -0.015 0.123 -0.033 -1.89 42.85 
 (0.000) (0.392) (0.426) (0.848)   
Kuwait 0.041 -0.008 0.089 -0.453 -25.07 **** 
 (0.061) (0.833) (0.004) (0.377)   
Nigiria 0.044 0.005 0.102 -0.037 -2.10 **** 
 (0.057) (0.853) (0.090) (0.509)   
Qatar 0.118 -0.013 -0.306 0.382 21.34 29.46 
 (0.023) (0.792) (0.479) (0.384)   
Saudi Arabia 0.057 0.013 -0.005 0.140 8.00 15.66 
 (0.000) (0.213) (0.761) (0.132)   
Turkey 0.080 -0.004 -0.020 0.293 16.42 15.62 
 (0.000) (0.832) (0.234) (0.227)   
South Africa 0.109 -0.057 -0.031 0.205 11.67 14.58 
 (0.000) (0.356) (0.244) (0.001)   
MENA/AFRICA 0.0820 -0.002 -0.010 0.223 12.60 9.12 
 (0.000) (0.903) (0.246) (0.014)   
5.2 Difference in conservatism across industries: 
 
Table 8 reports the estimation results of the Basu’s (1997) model by industries using the Fama-MacBeth method.  The 
asymmetric timeliness coefficient β3 is positive and significant for all industries except for OilandGas and Utilities sectors 
where the coefficient is positive but not significant. Among sectors where the coefficient β3 is positive and significant, we 
find that Telecommunications sector is the more conservative (β3=0.395; BASU=22.34 degrees; Average Adj. R²=21.66%) 
followed by ConsummerandServices Technology and Basic Materials sector. Consumer Goods is the less conservative 
sector (β3=0.0826; BASU=4.71 degrees; Average Adj. R²=4.27%). 
 
Table 8: Annual cross-sectional Fama–MacBeth regressions of earnings regressed on returns by industries 
 
Industry β0 β1 β2 β3 BASU Adj R² N 
OIl and Gas 
 
0.1099 
(0.0000) 
-0.0343 
(0.2210) 
-0.0219 
(0.3640) 
0.0450 
(0.2790) 2.58 10.75 590 
Basic Materials 
 
0.0710 
(0.0000) 
-0.0073 
(0.4480) 
0.0061 
(0.0040) 
0.1314 
(0.0000) 7.47 6.76 5427 
Industrials 
 
0.0659 
(0.0000) 
-0.0208 
(0.0560) 
-0.0004 
(0.7930) 
0.113 
(0.0000) 6.47 5.31 10929 
Consumer Goods 
 
0.0632 
(0.0000) 
-0.0299 
(0.0020) 
0.0007 
(0.7370) 
0.0826 
(0.0040) 4.71 4.27 8850 
Health Care 
 
0.0748 
(0.0000) 
-0.0074 
(0.3000) 
-0.0058 
(0.4970) 
0.1067 
(0.0010) 6.09 6.43 1771 
Consummer Services 0.0572 -0.0029 -0.0007 0.1475 8.39 5.99 2959 
  
 (0.0000) (0.7370) (0.8920) (0.0010) 
Telecommunications 
 
0.0360 
(0.1230) 
0.0288 
(0.3110) 
-0.2065 
(0.3490) 
0.3950 
(0.0950) 22.34 21.66 411 
Utilities 
 
0.0926 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.0085 
(0.5840) 
-0.0069 
(0.7330) 
0.3346 
(0.2350) 
18.54 14.12 1045 
Technology 
 
0.0433 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.0530 
(0.0830) 
 
-0.0180 
(0.1440) 
 
0.1194 
(0.0030) 
 
6.82 
 
7.21 
 
3864 
 
6. Conclusion: 
This paper examines the variation in time of conservatism in emerging countries over the period between 2000 and 2012. 
To do so, following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Lai et al. (2012), we use five different measures to assess the pattern and 
the shift into the degree of conservatism over time. Overall, there is no obvious trend in the level of conservatism for the 
full period. However, we have observed that there mainly two patterns. The first one indicates a decrease of conservatism 
through the period between 2000 and 2007 and the second shows that finical reporting systems are become more 
conservative since 2007 until present day with a peak in 2012. The second objective of our paper was to examine differences 
in the level of conservatism across regions, countries, and industries and. We find that countries from East Europe are more 
conservative, followed by Asia countries and MENA/Africa firms. However, firms from America region produce non 
conservative financial statements. In addition, we find that firms belong to telecommunications sector has earnings that are 
more conservative than other sectors. Understanding the pattern and differences in conservatism level is important for 
financial statement analysis, standard setters, securities regulation, investors, firms and academic research. Our work is 
subject to some limitations. First, all the presented methods are subject to criticisms. For example, one of the limitations of 
Basu (1997) measure is that it depends on the association between return and market information and on how can return 
absorbs this information, this implies that the market is efficient which cannot be the case of emerging markets. In addition, 
in emerging markets financial statements are released several month after the closing date, therefore market return may 
reflect past performance that current earnings. We use different measures of conservatism to mitigate the weakness of some 
measures and to have a minimum of robustness of our results. Second, many countries have been eliminated from our 
analysis due to missing data which can affect our cross-section comparisons.  Third, our study involves data gathered from 
many different countries with different institutional and culture factors which should be included in the analysis to more 
explain differences in our findings. Future research can be directed to examine the determinant factors of the change in the 
level of conservatism in time and across countries. 
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